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LITIGATION: THE NEW PRIVATE LAW
DISPUTE RESOLUTION PARADIGM
Linda S. Mullenix*
Synopsis: In one of the most famous law review articles ever
written, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, Professor Abram
Chayes in 1976 described a paradigm shift away from bipolar traditional
litigation to a new model of public law litigation. More than twenty
years later, at the end of the twentieth century, Professor Chayes's public
law paradigm no longer accurately captures the terrain of complex
disputes nor reflects the methods of private aggregate dispute resolution.
In American jurisprudence, the end of the twentieth century has been the
great era of aggregate private dispute resolution, a paradigm that shares
some attributes of the public law model. However, the public law model
differs in significant respects. Aggregate private dispute resolution has
stretched the boundaries of the judicial function, arrogating to private
parties and an array of judicial surrogates vast powers for resolving
aggregate claims. This aggregative private dispute resolution paradigm
resembles nothing so much as private legislation with wide-reaching
effects, carrying the imprimatur of judicial oversight and approval, but
frequently accompanied by troubling questions about fairness, adequate
representation, and the subtle merger of legislative, administrative, and
judicial functions.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1976 Professor Abram Chayes of the Harvard Law School
published what has been deemed one of the most influential pieces of
legal scholarship ever written: The Role of the Judge in Public Law
Litigation.' As described by Professor Richard Marcus more than a
decade later, Professor Chayes's article "was promptly embraced as a
classic, perhaps an icon."2 Professor Chayes's article had such impact
and lasting influence because his article described a paradigm shift in
American jurisprudence away from the traditional, two-party lawsuit
into the modem, sprawling complex litigation.
Nearly two decades later, Professor Chayes's public law model has
been embraced as the conceptual model for explaining and resolving
mass tort litigation. Yet, just as Professor Chayes's public law model was
dated even at the time he described it, the public law model also fails to
capture the dynamics of modem mass tort litigation. Thus, the public
law model is not only not descriptive of modem mass tort litigation, but
this model also fails as a prescriptive basis for resolving these cases.
If it is true that Professor Chayes's great insight was to capture a
significant paradigm shift in the litigation landscape of the 1950s and
1960s, then a new descriptive model is necessary to capture the litigation
landscape of two subsequent decades since Professor Chayes wrote, that
is, the 1980s and the 1990s. Although the types of complex litigation that
Professor Chayes identified have remained a fixture in the federal courts,
these two subsequent decades have been the era of mass tort litigation, a
type of litigation that had not truly emerged at the time Professor Chayes
formulated his thesis.
Accurately characterizing modem mass tort litigation is important
because this litigation has generated a new, hybrid form of dispute
resolution that shares attributes of both the private law and public law
models. More than twenty years later, at the end of the twentieth
century, Professor Chayes's public law paradigm no longer accurately
captures the terrain of complex disputes nor reflects the methods of
nineteenth-century private dispute resolution.

I Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1281 (1976).
For an analysis of the impact and influence of Professor Chayes's article, see Richard L.
Marcus, PublicLaw Litigation and Legal Scholarship, 21 MICH. J. L. REF. 647 (1988).
2 See Marcus, supra note 1, at 648.
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In American jurisprudence, the end of the twentieth century has
been the great era of aggregate private dispute resolution, a paradigm
that shares some attributes of the public law model, but it also differs
from the public law model in significant respects. This form of aggregate
private dispute resolution has stretched the boundaries of the judicial
function, arrogating to private parties and an array of judicial surrogates
vast powers for resolving aggregate claims. This aggregative private
dispute resolution paradigm resembles nothing so much as private
legislation with wide-reaching effects, carrying the imprimatur of
judicial oversight and approval, but frequently accompanied by
troubling questions about fairness, adequate representation, and the
subtle merger of legislative, administrative, and judicial functions.
This article first canvasses Professor Chayes's articulation of the
public law model, the context in which Professor Chayes generated his
thesis, and the late twentieth-century expansion of the public law model
to encompass mass tort litigation. The article then explains why the
public law model is an inapt explanatory paradigm for mass tort
litigation.
The discussion then focuses on four dimensions of the late
twentieth-century mass tort and other aggregate litigation that implicate
special concerns about these cases and that suggest that the paradigm is
closer to private legislation without meaningful representation. These
include issues relating to solicitation, adequate representation, and the
role of objectors and intervenors. This discussion also briefly canvasses
problems of copy-cat litigation, forum-shopping, attorneys' fees, and
other matters.
The article concludes with broad observations on the need for a new
descriptive model to capture the contemporary mass tort litigation
paradigm.

II. THE CLASSIC DESCRrIION OF PUBLIC LAW LITIGATION
A.

ProfessorChayes's Public Law Model

The central thesis of Professor Chayes's article was to contrast the
"traditional" civil lawsuit with the new litigation model that emerged
mid-twentieth century in the federal courts. Professor Chayes identified
five salient characteristics of the traditional civil case: (1) the lawsuit was
bipolar; (2) the litigation was retrospective; (3) the right and the remedy
were interdependent; (4) the lawsuit was a self-contained episode; and
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(5) the process was party-initiated and party-controlled. 3 Professor
Chayes then described a new "public law" model of adjudication as one
"sprawling and amorphous," "subject to change over the course of the
litigation," "suffused and intermixed with negotiating and mediating
processes at every point" with "the judge as a dominant figure in
organizing and guiding the case, as well as continuing involvement in
4
administration and implementation of relief."
Having described this paradigm shift, Professor Chayes identified
the types of litigation embraced by this new public law model:
School desegregation, employment discrimination, and
prisoners' or inmates' rights cases come readily to mind
as avatars of this new form of litigation. But it would be
mistaken to suppose that it is confined to these areas.
Antitrust, securities fraud and other aspects of the
conduct of corporate business, bankruptcy and
reorganizations, union governance, consumer fraud,
housing discrimination, electoral reapportionment,
environmental management-cases in all these field

3 See Chayes, supra note 1, at 1282-83.

4Id. For Professor Chayes's morphology of public law litigation, see id. at 1302, reproduced
below:
(1) The scope of the lawsuit is not exogenously given but is shaped
primarily by the court and the parties.
(2) The party structure is not rigidly bilateral but sprawling and
amorphous.
(3) The fact inquiry is not historical and adjudicative but predictive
and legislative.
(4) Relief is not conceived as compensation for past wrong in a form
logically derived from the substantive liability and confined in its
impact to the immediate parties; instead, it is forward looking,
fashioned ad hoc on flexible and broadly remedial lines, often having
important consequences for many persons including absentees.
(5) The remedy is not imposed but negotiated.
(6) The decree does not terminate judicial involvement in the affair: its
administration requires the continuing participation of the court.
(7) The judge is not passive, his function limited to analysis and
statement governing legal rules; he is active, with responsibility not
only for credible fact evaluation but for organizing and shaping the
litigation to ensure a just and viable outcome.
(8) The subject matter of the lawsuit is not a dispute between private
individuals about private rights, but a grievance about the operation of
public policy.
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display in varying degrees the features of public law
litigation.5
As others have noted, Professor Chayes's description was dated
even at the time he wrote and published his observations. 6 Published in
1976, Professor Chayes's analysis reflected dramatic changes in the
litigation landscape of 1950s and 1960s: an era marked at the outset by
the Supreme Court's 1954 decision in Brown v. Board of Education.7
Significantly, his list makes no mention of mass tort litigation, and for
good reason: in 1976 the modem dispersed mass tort had not yet
appeared on the litigation horizon. By the end of the 1970s, after
Professor Chayes published his classic description of public law
litigation, the federal (and later state) courts would begin to experience
the influx of the first generation mass tort cases: litigation related to
Agent Orange, asbestos, the Dalkon Shield, Bendectin, and DES.
Professor Chayes's vision, then, was cabined by a backward-looking
but nonetheless accurate reflection of events in the 1950s and 1960s. Of
especial importance to this vision was the fact that the decade from the
early 1960s to the early 1970s, when Professor Chayes would have been
writing his classic article, marked an unusual convergence of both
sweeping federal substantive legislation, coupled with massive federal
procedural reforms. Thus, after the assassination of President John
Kennedy in 1963, President Lyndon Johnson was able to effectively work
with Congress to enact a sweeping domestic legislative agenda,
otherwise known as "The Great Society." Among the most familiar
legislation, Congress in the 1960s enacted the Civil Rights Acts of 19648

3 Id.
6See Marcus, supra note 1, at 648. Assessing the lasting impact of Chayes's article, Professor

Marcus concluded that:
mhe returns are mixed: measured in terms of doctrinal impact, a
traditional yardstick for evaluating legal scholarship, the article was a
failure.... But this fate may have been inevitable since the article was
bereft of any doctrinal prescription. Perhaps more basically, Chayes's
focus on public law litigation seems ill-conceived because the
incidence of the kind of lawsuits he had in mind-school
desegregation and prison conditions cases--was waning even as he
wrote.
Id.
7 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

8 The

Civil Rights Act of 1964 contained several titles: Titles I and VIII contained voting
rights provisions; Titles IIIand IV dealt with school and public facility desegregation; Title
D authorized federal intervention in lawsuits claiming a denial of equal protection. See
generally The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241-68.
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and 1968, 9 the Voting Rights Acts of 196510 and 1970,11 and in the 1970s
such legislation as the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976.12
Thus, Congress in the 1960s enacted federal substantive legislation
that would affect the social, political, economic, and judicial landscape
for decades to come. What also is highly significant, however, is that at
this same time the federal judiciary, through its constituent rulemaking
committees, simultaneously rewrote many of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure to expand the scope of the civil action. Thus, in 1966,
13
Congress enacted a "rules package" of substantially amended rules,
most notably, Rule 18,14 dealing with joinder of claims and remedies,
Rule 19,15 dealing with necessary and indispensable parties and renamed
"Joinder of Persons Needed for a Just Adjudication," Rule 20,16 dealing
with permissive joinder of parties; Rule 2317 the class action rule, and
Rule 24,18 dealing with intervention.
This historic 1966 rules package was united by an overarching
philosophy. By the early 1960s, the Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules-with more than twenty years experience of the original ruleshad concluded that certain federal rules actually were functioning

942 U.S.C. §§ 1983 et seq. (1994). The 1968 Civil Rights Act added provisions to the federal
criminal laws to deal with civil rights violence, see 18 U.S.C. § 245 (1994); and Title VII
provided for a comprehensive fair housing law. Other provisions related to Native
American rights, see titles H-VUI and provisions on civil disobedience and rioting. See
generally The Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L No. 90-284,82 Stat. 73-92.
10 See generally The Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437-46.
11 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994); see also generally The Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970,
Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314-19.
-242 U.S.C. § 1988 (b) (1994); see also generally The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act
of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559,90 Stat. 2641.
13 For commentary on the 1966 amendments to the federal rules, see generally Benjamin
Kaplan, Continuing the Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure(1), 81 HARV. L.REV. 356 (1967) and Sherman Cohn, The New FederalRules of
Civil Procedure,54 GEo.L.J. 1204 (1966).
14FED. R. CIv. P. 18 ("Joinder of Claims and Remedies").
15FED. R. CIrv. P. 19 ("Joinder of Persons Needed for a Just Adjudication"). For the Supreme
Court's flexible interpretation of the 1966 amendment to this rule, see Provident Tradesmens
Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson,390 U.S. 102 (1968).
16FED R. Civ. P. 20 ("Permissive Joinder of Parties").
'7 FED. R. CIV. P. 23 ("Class Actions").
19 FED. R. CIV. P. 24 ("Intervention"). The Advisory Committee on Civil Rules also
amended FED. R. CIv. P. 17 ("Parties Plaintiff and Defendant; Capacity," dealing with the
so-called real party-in-interest rule). For the Supreme Court's liberal interpretation of the
1966 amended rule relating to intervention, see Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El PasoNatural
Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129 (1967). See also Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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contrary to the spirit of the 1938 rulemakers. 19 Rather than facilitating
the liberal joinder of parties and claims, by the early 1960s the federal
rules had instead calcified into its own set of rigid, inflexible, and
limiting principles that defeated the liberal intent of the 1938 rulemakers.
Hence, the 1966 rules package was intended to correct the inflexibility
that had accreted to the joinder provisions. Indeed, the Advisory
Committee Notes to each amended rule reflected the problems with the
original rule and the new intended liberal use for the amended rules.
Three points are in order. First, it is easy to underestimate the
impact of the 1966 revisions to the federal rules. The rulemakers in the
early 1960s substantially rewrote or redrafted all the joinder rules to
eliminate rigid categories, vague and uncertain language, and
ambiguous and uncertain terminology. Because we have lived with
these rule amendments for the past thirty years, it is easy to lose sight of
the fact that the 1966 amendments embodied a wholesale, sweeping rule
reform intended to provide maximum flexibility to accomplish joinder of
claims and parties in one civil action.
Second, the wholesale revision to the joinder rules in turn
encouraged and ushered in a new age of complex litigation that
essentially had not existed in federal practice prior to the 1966
amendments. There is not, for example, a large corpus of federal class
action decisional law prior to 1966, chiefly because class actions were not
a major portion of the federal court dockets and the original class action
rule was difficult to construe and apply. 20
The flexibility and liberal ethos of the 1966 rule amendments
basically invited complexity, encouraging attorneys to join everyone and
everything into one civil action. Indeed, the amended intervention rule
provided an invitation to persons who were outside the litigation to join
in as well. In short, the 1966 rules package made possible modern
federal complex litigation as we know it.
In the same spirit that inspired the 1966 rule amendments, Congress
in 1968 enacted the federal multidistrict litigation statute1 that liberally

19The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were promulgated under the authority of the Rules
Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2072 (1994), and were enacted into law by Congress in Sept.
16,1938. See FED. R.Civ. P. 1 advisory committee's notes.
For an excellent analysis and discussion of the types of cases, by decades, on federal court
dockets, see generally EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., LrrIGATIoN AND INEQUALITY: FEDERAL
DvEasrrY JURsDiCnON IN INDu TRiAL AMERICA (1992).
21

See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1994).
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provided for the transfer of cases within the federal system to one venue
for coordinated pre-trial proceedings. 22 The MDL statute, then, also
made possible modem federal complex litigation as we know it. It also
should be noted that this same period was the era in which the federal
courts, led by the Supreme Court, expanded standing doctrines to
liberally permit access to the federal courts-yet another factor that
contributed to the burgeoning complex litigation in the 1960s and
1970s. 23
Third, and most significantly, this complete revamping of the
federal joinder rules coincided with the concurrent congressional
enactment of new, sweeping substantive legislation that provided
American citizens with new substantive rights. Thus, 1966 marks a
unique convergence in American history: the creation of a vast array of
new substantive rights that could be harnessed to newly-enacted
powerful procedural means for enforcing those rights.
Perhaps the centerpiece of the 1966 amendments was the complete
redrafting of Rule 23, the federal class action rule. As has been often
retold, 24 Rule 23 was entirely rewritten in 1966 to eliminate the original
rule's rigid categories and to provide maxim flexibility for pursuing
relief through this form of representative litigation. 25 After canvassing
the myriad problems that the original class action rule had encountered
in practice, the Advisory Committee indicated:
The amended rule describes in more practical terms the
occasions for maintaining class actions; provides that all
class actions maintained to the end as such will result in

22The standard for creation of a multidistrict litigation, or "MDL," is quite liberal. The rule
simply provides:
When civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact are
pending in different districts, such actions may be transferred to any
district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings. Such
transfers shall be made by the judicial panel on multidistrict litigation
authorized by this section upon its determination that transfers for
such proceedings will be for the convenience of parties and witnesses
and will promote the just and efficient conduct of such actions.
28 U.S.C. § 1407 (a) (1994); see also The Multidistrict Litigation Act, Pub. L. No. 70-296, 82
Stat. 109 (1968).
23See, e.g., United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727
(1972).
24
See, e.g., Amchem Prods. Co., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 2245-47 (1997).
2s See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note (1966 amendment to Rule). See also
generally Cohn, supra note 13; Kaplan, supra note 13.
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judgments including those whom the court finds to be
members of the class, whether or not the judgment is
favorable to the class; and refers to the measures which
26
can be taken to assure the fair conduct of these actions.
It is no surprise, then, that the mid-1960s ushered in a decade of
bustling class action activity. This decade-upon which Professor
Chayes reflected-was chiefly the decade of the great Rule 23(b)(2)
injunctive class action. Attorneys quickly learned to harness the Rule
23(b)(2) class action to seek remediation under the civil rights laws and
related legislation. Hence, the publication of Professor Chayes's classic
article in 1976, exactly one decade after the 1966 historic rules package,
aptly captured the synergistic interaction of the new federal substantive
law coupled with liberalized federal procedure. As Professor Chayes
observed, this combination of events resulted in a paradigm shift to a
new type of litigation, his public law model.
B.

The Public Law Model and Mass Tort Litigation
1.

The Public Law Model Applied to Mass Tort Litigation

Professor Chayes's description of the public law model is insightful,
and it did captivate the essence of the paradigm shift that had occurred
in the prior decade. In hindsight, however, Professor Chayes's model
captured a brief historical moment; he did not anticipate the modern
dispersed mass tort litigation or foresee the types of complex litigation
that would vex the federal judiciary at the end of the century.
The question, then, is to what extent Professor Chayes's public law
model has narrative or prescriptive power for contemporary complex
litigation, particularly mass tort litigation. The salient question is
whether complex mass tort cases, based as they are in the adjudication of
private harms, are yet another model of civil dispute resolution anchored
in the "public law" concept of the 1960s.
Professor David Rosenberg of Harvard Law School and Judge Jack
Weinstein of the Eastern District of New York have been leading
proponents of this view. 27 Judge Weinstein, famously the federal judge

2 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (advisory committee's note to 1966 amendment).
2 See, e.g, David Rosenberg, Class Actions For Mass Torts: Doing IndividualJustice by Collective
Means, 62 IND. L.J. 561 (1987); David Rosenberg, Toxic Tort Litigation: Crisisor Chrysalis? A
Comment on Feinberg's Conceptual Problems and Proposed Solutions, 24 Hous. L. REv. 183
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who negotiated the Agent Orange settlement 28 and has since managed
numerous other mass tort cases, 29 readily analogized mass tort litigation
to the 1960s institutional reform litigation with which he was very
familiar. Thus, Judge Weinstein explained:
Mass tort cases are akin to public litigations involving
court-ordered restructuring of institutions to protect
constitutional rights. In dealing with such mass tort
cases as Agent Orange, asbestos, and DES, I have sensed
an atmosphere similar to that of public interest cases I
have supervised, such as the Mark Twain school
desegregation case, the reform of the Suffolk County
Developmentally Disabled Center, and jail and prison
reform litigation.
Mass tort cases and public litigations both implicate
serious political and sociological issues.
Both are
restrained by economic imperatives. Both have strong
psychological underpinnings. And both affect larger
communities than those encompassed by the litigants
before the court.3°
Applying this public law model to the mass tort context, 31 Judge
Weinstein concluded:

(1987); David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Tort Exposure Cases: A Public Law"
Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849 (1984)
28 See generally PETER H. ScHucK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL MASs ToXIc DiSTERs IN THE
COURTS (1986); see also In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987).
29See, e.g., In re Repetitive Stress Injury Litig., 11 F.3d 368 (2d Cir. 1993); In re DES Cases,
789 F. Supp. 552, appeal dismissed, 7 F.3d 20 (2d Cir. 1993); In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos
Litig., 134 F.R.D. 32 (E.D. & S.D.N.Y. 1990).
30
Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 469, 473-74
(1994) (internal citations to cases deleted).
31 Discussing the judge's role in mass tort litigation, Judge Weinstein states:
In a mass tort case, a judge's failure to appreciate the reach and
importance of his or her decisions is tantamount to abdication of
responsibility. Much as the President steers the ship of state at the
head of the executive branch, each federal judge, with respect to each
case that comes before him or her, stands watch over the judicial
branch. The trial judge is in most cases the final arbiter. If the trial
judge fails to respond to the needs of the public, the only recourse is to
appellate judges who are narrowly confined in matters of fact and who
are usually in a far worse position than the nisi prius judge to
understand the full scope of a litigation. A rigid and unresponsive
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Mass tort cases unfortunately do not involve the
application of legislative schemes representing careful
analysis of the policy problems presented. By their very
nature, these cases involve unanticipated problems with
wide-ranging social and political ramifications. A judge
does not "legislate from the bench" simply because he or
she considers the broadest implications of his or her
decisions in such a case. Judges not only may take such
a view; they must.32
Thus, Judge Weinstein easily extrapolated from his 1960s experience
of institutional reform litigation 33 to the 1970s and 80s phenomenon of
mass tort litigation. Not only did he view these cases as akin to the
sprawling, amorphous public law cases of the 1960s, but the public law
model also supplied Judge Weinstein with the rationale and justification
for a modem type of managerial judging that he endorses:
[Jiudges, particularly in mass tort cases, cannot and
should not remain neutral and passive in the face of
problems implicating the public interest. In mass tort
cases, the judge often cannot rely on the litigants to
frame the issues appropriately. The judge cannot focus
narrowly on the facts before the court, declining to take
into account the relationship of those facts to the social
realities beyond the courthouse door. The judge cannot

judiciary, blind to the needs of various commuities and of society at
large, is far more likely to cause an erosion of public confidence in
legal institutions than a judiciary perceived as overly interested in
resolving the problems before it.
Id. at 541.
32Id. (citations deleted).
33In drawing the analogy, Judge Weinstein cites to classic 1960s-style institutional reform
litigation, citing Knight v. Alabama, 787 F. Supp. 1030 (N.D. Ala. 1991) (action brought by
United States to desegregate colleges and universities in Alabama); Armour v. Ohio, 775 F.
Supp. 1044 (N.D. Ohio 1991) (constitutional challenge to state legislative reapportionment
brought by black voters); Ayers v. Alain, 674 F. Supp. 1523 (N.D. Miss. 1987) (action against
various state officials alleging constitutional and civil rights violations from racially dual
system of higher public education), rev'd, 893 F.2d 732 (9th Cir.), affd 914 F.2d 676 (5th Cir.
1990) (en banc), vacated sub non. United States v. Fordice, 112 S. Ct. 2727 (1992). See
Weinstein, supra note 30, at 540 n.286.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1999

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 33, No. 2 [1999], Art. 1

424 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33
depend upon the slow creep of case-by-case
34
adjudication to yield just results and just rules of law.
In this respect the problem is analogous to that of institutional reform
litigation.
2.

The Public Law Model and Mass Tort Litigation:
Paradigm

An Inapt

As I have indicated elsewhere, 35 the Chayes's public law model,
while superficially appealing as a descriptive model for mass tort cases,
does not translate well into mass tort litigation. In some ways mass tort
cases do fit the description of the public law paradigm. Mass tort cases
are "sprawling and amorphous litigation," "subject to change over the
course of the litigation," and "suffused with negotiating and mediating
processes at every point." In many mass tort cases the "judge is the
dominant figure in organizing and guiding the case."
But the analogy ends there. In short, the modem mass tort litigation
is, in significant ways, dissimilar from the public law model. 36 Many of
these dissimilarities are crucial to understanding that modem mass tort
litigation has given rise to a new form of dispute resolution that
represents nothing so much as aggregative private legislation often
without the benefit of meaningful representation. What is needed, then,
is a new descriptive paradigm for mass tort litigation and the way these
cases are resolved.

34

Weinstein, supra note 30, at 540-41 (internal citations deleted).

Judge Weinstein

specifically invoked institutional law reform litigation with which he had been involved:
In the Mark Twain Junior High School desegregation cases, special
master and I had to consider neighborhood ethnic relationships,
housing, parks, police, transportation, and other problems. We also
had to contend with diverse parents' groups and federal, state, and city
authorities. I have had the same experience in other institutional
reform cases, as have other judges...
Id. See also generally JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION: THE
EFFECT OF CLASS ACTIONS, CONSOLIDATIONS, AND OTHER MULTIPARTY DEVICES (1995).
3
sLinda
S. Mullenix, Mass Tort as Public Law Litigation: ParadigmMisplaced, 88 Nw. U. L.
REV. 579 (1994).
36
Professor Marcus seems to believe that there is some application of the Chayes model to
certain types of aggregate tort litigation. See Marcus, supra note 1, at 671-75. But the type
of tort litigation Professor Marcus describes (essentially injunctive litigation to protect
workers against a smoked-filled environment) is more readily analogized to the public law
model than other types of products or pharmaceuticals mass torts.
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Also, when I speak of mass tort litigation, primarily I am referring to
mass personal injury litigation such as the Agent Orange or asbestos
litigation or the array of defective products and pharmaceutical litigation
that courts have experienced during the last decade. 37 There have been
other types of mass tort litigation, however, that have not been pursued
based on personal injury claims, yet these cases have been swept up in
the rubric of mass tort litigation.
For example, the Castano nicotine-addiction class, which was a
nationwide class of claimants, was brought under nine separate causes of
action 38 and explicitly excluded personal injury claims. 39 Nonetheless,
many continue generically to refer to Castano as a mass tort case. The
School Asbestos Litigation, which spanned the decade from the early 1980s
through the mid-1990s, dealt with the abatement of asbestos from school
buildings and was essentially grounded in breach of contract and
property claims, although some tort theories were alleged. 4°
Additionally, the mass tort label has been expanded to include class
actions brought for alleged human rights violations 41 under various
theories of federal common and statutory law. 42

37

Mass tort have been brought relating to orthopedic pedicle screws, see In re Orthopedic
Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., 176 F.R.D. 158 (E.D. Pa. 1997); fen-phen, see In re Diet Drugs
(Phentermine, Fenfluramine, Dexfenfluramine) Prods. Liab. Litig., 1999 WL 106887 (E.D.
Pa. 1999), Oren v. Stafford, 34 F. Supp. 2d 906 (D. N.J. 1999); pacemaker leads, see In re
Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 172 F.R.D. 271 (S.D. Ohio 1997); silicone breast implants, see
In re Dow Coming Corp., 211 B.R. 545 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1997), In re Breast Implant Cases,
942 F. Supp. 958 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1996), and In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab.
Litig., 1994 WL 114580 (N.D. Ala. 1994); penile implants, see In re American Med. Sys., Inc.,
75 F.3d 1069 (6th Cir. 1996); blood products, see In re Rhone-Poulenc, Rover, Inc., 51 F.3d
1293 (7th Cir. 1995); heart valves, see Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 143 F.RD. 141 (S.D. Ohio 1992);
and lead paint, see German v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp., 885 F. Supp. 537, 571
(S.D.N.Y 1995), Ashton v. Pierce, 541 F. Supp. 635 (D.D.C. 1982).
m Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 160 F.R.D. 544 (E.D. La. 1995), rev'd 84 F.3d 734 (5th
Cir. 1996) (in which nine causes of action pleaded were fraud and deceit, negligent
misrepresentation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence and negligent
infliction of emotional distress, violation of consumer protection statutes under state law,
breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranty, strict products liability, and
redhibition pursuant to the Louisiana Civil Code).
" Id. at 548 n.2 ("The Court specifically makes no findings concerning class certification
involving personal injury damages at this time, as these allegations are not before the

Court.").
40

In re School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir. 1986) (in which the claims were based
on negligence, strict liability, intentional tort, breach of warranty, concert of action, and
civil conspiracy).
41See In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig., 910 F. Supp. 1460 (D. Haw. 1995); see also
generally Sol Schreiber & Laura D. Weissbach, In Re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos, Human
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Even further removed from the personal-injury mass tort litigation
are small claims consumer class actions that nonetheless may be based
on various tort theories such as fraud or misrepresentation. However,
many of the characteristic features of mass tort litigation-and the
problems that these cases inspire-apply with equal force to small claims
consumer class actions.
C.

The Mass Tort Public Law Misfit

There are many ways in which mass tort litigation does not fit well
within the public law paradigm. 43 First, mass tort cases typically involve
private parties alleging private harms. Mass tort cases-at least first
generation mass tort cases 44-certainly begin as a simple tort brought by
an individual against a private party or, more usually, against a
corporate entity. With the exception of the Agent Orange litigation,
mass tort cases do not involve litigation against federal or state
governments or other governmental entities.
Second, mass tort litigation also is not typically brought seeking the
reform of public or quasi-public institutions, such as school systems,
mental health facilities, prison systems, or legislative districting. With
the recent exception of the tobacco litigation, mass tort litigation rarely is
pursued by state attorney generals or other public officials acting parens
patrie on behalf of citizens, as these officials would in antitrust litigation,
for example. Thus, very little mass tort litigation is directly invested
with a public purpose.
However, some small claims consumer actions may result from
governmental investigations into the activities of certain regulated
industries. Thus, it is not uncommon for a class action against an
insurance company to originate with an investigation by a state attorney

Rights Litigation: A PersonalAccount of the Role of the Special Master,31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 475,

485(1998).
See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (federal common law
task of enforcing international law prohibiting torture); Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350
(1994); Torture Victim Protection Act, Pub. L.102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992).
43 These comments are adapted and expanded from my previous article. See Mullenix,
supranote 35, at 581-82.
" I characterize the "first generation" of mass torts as the paradigm mass torts that
emerged at the end of the 1970s, namely, litigation involving Agent Orange, the Dalkon
Shield, asbestos, and Bendectin. See Linda S. Mullenix, Practical Wisdom and ThirdGenerationMass Tort Litigation, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 551,552-53 (1998).
4
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general's office or a state administrative agency, such as the state
insurance department.
Third, the underlying claims in mass tort litigation are grounded in
common law tort theories or perhaps applicable state statutory schemes,
such as the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act.45 Mass tort litigation,
then, quintessentially is grounded in local law; that is, the determination
by state courts or legislatures concerning the rights and duties of private
parties in their interactions with one another.
In contrast, the classic public law litigation involves constitutional
claims or claims grounded in federal statutory schemes, such as the civil
rights or voting rights laws. Such federal legislative schemes embody
Congress's intention to federalize remediation across state lines. But
there is no federal law of tort, and mass tort litigation remains a creature
of state law. As is well-known, the state-based nature of mass tort
litigation has contributed greatly to the federal courts' conclusion that
multi-state mass tort litigation is not suited for resolution under the
federal courts' diversity jurisdiction. 46
Fourth, the judicial system has grappled with mass tort litigation in
a variety of ways, some more controversially and successfully than
others. Mass tort litigation has been subjected to various procedural
techniques, including consolidations, multidistrict litigation, class
actions, alternative dispute resolution, bankruptcy, and the use of an
array of judicial surrogates, including guardians, special masters,
magistrates, and court-appointed panels and experts.4 7
Viewing just the class action option, courts have certified mass tort
cases under all provisions of Rule 23, including Rule 23(b)(1) limited
issues classes, 48 Rule 23(b)(2) injunctive or declaratory classes, 49 and Rule

45

TEx.

Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.41 et seq. (West 1987) (Deceptive Trade Practices Act).

46 The

Fifth and Seventh Circuits have repudiated attempts to certify multi-claim
nationwide class actions that include claimants from all fifty states where choice-of-law
differences in state law cannot be solved by recourse to "grouping" similar laws by
homogenizing state law differences through use of "Esperanto"-style jury instructions. See
Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer,
Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995).
47See WEINSrEIN, supra note 34, at 128-46 (discussing various procedural techniques for
resolving mass tort litigation); Symposium on Mass Torts, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 353 (1998)
(various articles describing methods for resolving mass tort litigation, including mediation,
settlement classes, Chapter 11 bankruptcy, special masters, claims-processing facilities, and
arbitration).
4
8 See, e.g., In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., 176 F.R.D. 158 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
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23(b)(3) compensatory damage classes. 50 In short, just as there is no
paradigmatic mass tort litigation, there also is no paradigmatic method
for resolving these cases.
The classic public law litigation, in contrast, typically was resolved
either through a Rule 23(b)(2) injunctive class, or through a consent
decree. 5 ' There can be little doubt that the 1960s and 1970s was the
heyday of the Rule 23(b)(2) injunctive-relief class and the great era of the
consent decree.5 2 But we do not typically resolve mass torts through
either of these auspices.
Indeed, with the exception of medical
monitoring classes, the Rule 23(b)(2) injunctive class has little or no
application in the mass tort context, and no mass tort case has ever been
resolved, to my knowledge, through the auspices of a consent decree.
Sixth, and this is a related point, the 1960s-style public law litigation
usually involved "homogenous" classes of claimants suffering
essentially a common harm, and this group homogenity made equitable
injunctive relief an appropriate form of remediations 3 The modem mass
tort litigation, in contrast, often attempts to aggregate "heterogeneous"
claimants with highly individualized harms.54 Hence, this difference has
inspired the great debate whether certain types of mass torts can ever be
certified as Rule 23(b)(3) class actions, which require additional findings
of predominance of common questions and superiority.55 This lack of

4 See, e.g., Day v. NLO, Inc., 144 F.R.D. 330, 335-36 (S.D. Ohio 1992), overruled on other
grounds sub nom. In re NLO, Inc., 5 F.3d 154 (6th Cir. 1993) (medical monitoring class).
50 See, e.g, Jenkins v. Raymark Industries, 782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1986); see also In re School
Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir. 1986).
51And much of Professor Chayes's analysis discusses the structural consent decree as one
of the key features of public law litigation. See Chayes, supra note 1, at 1298-1302.
-2See, e.g., Lloyd C. Anderson, The Approval and Interpretationof Consent Decrees in Civil
Rights Class Action Litigation, 1983 U. ILL L. REV. 579; see also Larry Kramer, Consent Decrees
and the Rights of Third Parties,87 MIcH. L. REv. 321 (1988); Thomas Mengler, Consent Decree
Paradigms: Models Without Meaning, 29 B.C. L. REV. 291 (1988); Symposium, Consent Decrees:
PracticalProblems and Legal Dilemmas, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1. Academic interest in the
phenomenon of consent decrees has waned in the last decade.
53See, e.g., Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239,256 (3d Cir. 1975) ("The very nature
of the (b)(2) class is that it is homogeneous without any conflicting interests between the
members of the class. Since the class is cohesive, its members would be bound either by
the collateral estoppel or the stare decisis effect of a suit brought by an individual
plaintiff.").
54Id. at 249. ("Binding all members of a (b)(3) class, however, was not thought by the
Advisory Committee to be as fair as binding all members of a (b)(2) class. By the very
nature of a heterogeneous (b)(3) class, there would be many instances where a particular
individual would not want to be included as a member of the class.").
m See FED. R.Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
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predominance of common questions among asbestos claimants was one
of the major reasons why the Supreme Court repudiated the asbestos
56
settlement class in Amchem Products v. Windsor.
Seventh, mass tort litigation typically does not involve ongoing
supervision by the courts or the presiding judge once a mass tort has
been settled or otherwise resolved. If mass torts are resolved through
settlement, the court's final active participation most likely involves
notice to class claimants of the settlement and a fairness hearing to
approve the agreement. The conclusion of a bankruptcy resolution of a
mass tort operates somewhat similarly, with a process akin to a fairness
hearing.
But the parties themselves will implement the settlement or
bankruptcy terms, and this will be accomplished by the creation of a
claims facility or perhaps a medical monitoring fund or implementation
through other private-party auspices, such as mediation or arbitration.
In short, in mass tort litigation once the case has been resolved, the
presiding judge is out of the loop.
In the classic public law litigation, however, the judicial system may
be involved for years in implementing and overseeing injunctive relief or
a consent decree.57 In addition, courts in the classic public law litigation
retain continuing jurisdiction over the litigation. While this is not
required by Rule 23(e),58 some courts have claimed continuing
jurisdiction to enforce the provisions of a settlement agreement.5 9 At any
rate, continuing court jurisdiction over a mass tort settlement is rare.
Eighth, mass tort litigation (with a few exceptions) typically is
litigation seeking compensatory and exemplary damages, either on an
individual or common fund basis. The classic public law litigation, in
contrast, was quintessentially equitable in nature, seeking primarily
injunctive or declaratory relief or other non-compensatory remediation
such as a consent decree. The nature of the claim and remedy is
important for Seventh Amendment reasons-thus, mass tort litigation
-6117 S. Ct. 2231, 2249-50 (1997).
57 See Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265 (S.D. Tex. 1980), affd in part & rev'd in part, 679 F.2d

1115 (5th Cir. 1982), amended in part & vacated in part, 688 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1982).
58 See 7B CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACrICE AND PROCEDURE § 1797 (1998
supp.) ("Additionally, although Rule 23(e) requires court approval of any settlement
agreement, it does not require the court to retain continuing jurisdiction once the
agreement has been approved to ensure that it is enforced appropriately.").
59Id.
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implicates a right to trial by jury, 60 whereas the 1960s-style public law
litigation, seeking equitable relief, did not.
It is quite likely that there are many other reasons why modem mass
tort litigation does not resemble the public law paradigm, but where
does this leave us? Judge Weinstein's point (and those who agree with
him that the public law paradigm is a useful model for thinking about
mass tort litigation) is that the public law paradigm justifies a 1960s-style
activist judiciary when resolving these cases. The public law paradigm
also justifies expanding traditional doctrine for the community good, as
defined by the managerial judge. For example, Judge Weinstein
endorses a more restrictive view of protective orders in mass tort cases
that affect the community. Thus, he favors more public disclosure of and
61
less protection for corporate secrets.
But if mass tort litigation does not resemble the public law model in
most significant respects, then what are the lessons from this paradigm
for the resolution of mass tort cases? Because I view mass tort litigation
as quite dissimilar from the classic public law litigation of the 1960s, I
think that it is difficult to draw any instructive lessons. More
importantly, I do not believe that the 1960s public law model can be used
to justify creative expansion (or contraction) of traditional doctrine in
mass tort cases. If judges wish to abrogate tradition doctrine (as for
example, Judge Weinstein's view of protective orders), then this mass
tort activism must be justified on some other reasoned basis than merely
the suggestion that mass tort cases are the 1990s version of public law
litigation.
Even more troubling, most mass tort litigation is not resolved in any
fashion remotely resembling the way in which public law litigation was
resolved in the 1960s and 1970s. In reality, the judiciary is much less
involved with either the resolution or the implementation of remedies in

60 Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 751 (5th Cir. 1996); In re Rhone-Poulenc

Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1295 (7th Cir. 1995).
61See WEINSTEIN, supra, note 34, at 69-72:

[Ilin cases dealing with sociopolitical problems, the court must look to
the effect on the community. The individual litigant's needs cannot be
the court's sole concern. The mass tort case is, as already noted, similar
to an institutional reform case in its impact. The public, which created
and funds our judicial institutions, depends on those institutions to
protect it. Sometimes the needs of individual members of the
community must yield to those of the community as a whole.
See also Weinstein, supra,note 30, at 511-19.
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mass tort cases. Admittedly, there are several prominent and wellknown "mass tort judges" throughout the federal judiciary. But there
also are many mass tort cases where the judge, having received the mass
tort on his or her docket, then structures a litigation bureaucracy and
sends the attorneys forth to broker a settlement and does not see the
attorneys again until a settlement is accomplished. Rather, we have
moved to some other model that is chiefly characterized by a
privitization of mass tort dispute resolution.
In this model, the parties-through an array of private surrogatesnegotiate some compromised resolution of aggregate claims. In this
model, the judge is involved to the extent of conferring a judicial
imprimatur on a negotiated resolution of the mass claims. After the
conferral of the judicial imprimatur, private auspices then administer
claims relief. Notwithstanding a great deal of rhetoric to the contrary, in
this model the role of the judiciary is quite minimal; it serves as a kind of
filing office for grievances, a brokerage house for structuring attorney
committees, and a blessings-office for compromised claims.
III. MASS TORT

LITIGATION: PRIVATE AGGREGATE CLAIM RESOLUTION

My thesis is this: mass tort litigation at the end of the twentieth
century has engendered a shift in the litigation landscape away from
1960s-style public law litigation. Modern mass tort litigation represents
a kind of privitization of aggregate claims resolution. What is confusing
is that this litigation looks as though it is resolved through traditional
judicial auspices, but in reality little of mass tort litigation actually is
filtered through judicial process.
The modem mass tort paradigm instead involves the wholesale
resolution of aggregate private claims through private auspices without
the significant involvement of the very people whose claims are being
resolved in wholesale fashion. Thus, the mass tort paradigm resembles
more closely private legislation implemented through private
administrative means but still sanctioned with a judicial imprimatur.
Mass tort litigation and late twentieth-century small claims
consumer class actions support the thesis that we have moved to a model
of the privatization of aggregate claim resolution. It is difficult to map
the terrain of mass tort litigation, in part because no two mass tort
litigations are alike. 62 Nonetheless, these cases illustrate interesting

See Mulenix, supra, note 44, at 553.
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cracks along the fault lines of aggregate dispute resolution. A discussion
of some of these problems illuminates the ways in which modem mass
tort and other aggregate litigation have exacerbated issues relating to
adequate representation and fairness in resolving these cases.
A cautionary note is in order. The following discussion, similar to
Professor Chayes's seminal article, describes "shifts in activities and
Like Professor Chayes's musings, these
suggests implications."6
comments are highly impressionistic, not authoritative, nor a source of
empirical data. Indeed, they are not based on any empirical data.
Similar to Professor Chayes's article, it is hoped that a description of
these issues will serve as a stimulus to others "that will give content to
these musings." 64 Finally, I reach no normative conclusions about the
activities that I will describe. I intend only to provide observations about
the development, progress, and prosecution of these cases in the federal
and state judicial systems.
A.

Solicitation of Claimants

There is no doubt that many, if not most, mass tort litigations begin
with a plaintiff who has been wronged and who is suffering from some
harm, injury, or disease. Many, if not most, of the first and second
generation mass torts also began with an injured plaintiff seeking the
services of an attorney. But as the mass tort phenomenon has seeped
into the public consciousness and has permeated throughout the legal
culture over the last twenty years, we now have third-generation mass
tort litigation that is sometimes not initiated by an individually-injured
plaintiff. Instead, we sometimes now have attorneys conceiving of the

63

Marcus, supra, note 1, at 652. Professor Marcus characterizes Professor Chayes's article as
a "distinctive piece of scholarship for several reasons":
First, it is almost bereft of traditional doctrinal analysis. At most, it
describes ways in which doctrine does not fit shifts in activity and
suggests implications. Second, the article is highly impressionistic.
Although it cites cases, it uses them neither as authority nor as a source
of empirical data. Third, it is far from specific on how the rules that
are discussed should be regauged to accommodate the shift Chayes
described in the character of litigation. At most, the article might act as
a stimulus for work by others that would give content to these

musings. Finally, it tied the characteristics of "mundane" procedural
rules to broad issues of social policy, hardly the norm of much
procedural scholarship at the time.
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mass tort and then finding the client or, in the context of mass tort
litigation, finding the thousands of clients.
A few points are in order. In many jurisdictions there is generally
nothing wyong with this, 65 or at least there are few sanctions for
transgressing solicitation rules, except for egregious violations. 66 Some
states have enacted statutes to curb in-person direct solicitation after
mass accidents, such as airplane crashes. 67 But these rules do not apply
to personal-injury dispersed-mass torts. Nor they do they apply to other
types of aggregate litigation, such as small claims consumer classes.
Indeed, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct were not drafted with
complex litigation in mind and certainly not with the concept of the
modem mass tort. 68
Thus, if a client has already contacted an attorney and entered into a
professional relationship, then no solicitation rule is breached if the
attorney solicits other clients with similar claims. 69 In Texas, for
example, an attorney who does not even have an initial client may place
a State Bar-approved advertisement in the newspapers or broadcast a
solicitation on television, seeking persons who have taken a
pharmaceutical or used a particular product.
As the breast implant litigation has demonstrated, modem
advertising techniques can effectively expand classes exponentially
beyond the original estimates of possible claimants. Thus, expansive
attorney advertising techniques, coupled with virtually negligible
enforcement of solicitation rules, has fostered the creation of enormous

See generally 2 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING:
A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcT §§ 7.1 et seq. (2d ed. 1990)
(communications concerning a lawyer's services); see also Eric S. Roth, Confronting
Solicitation of Mass DisasterVictims, 26 GEO. J. LEGAL ETics 967 (1989).
6See, e.g., Musslewhite v. State Bar of Texas, 786 S.W.2d 437 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (affirming
attorney suspension for various violations of the Texas Code of Professional Responsibility
for improper solicitations of clients following mass disaster).
6 See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Went For It, 515 U.S. 618 (1995) (upholding Florida statute
forbidding targeted mail advertising to prospective clients if the cause of action relates to
personal injury, wrongful death, or other accidents or disasters); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar
Ass'n, 436 U.S. 437 (1978); Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. Allen, 479 S.E.2d 317 (W. Va. 1996).
6Weinstein, supra note 30, at 481-85.
6See HEBERT NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACIONS § 1504 (3d ed. 1992)
(citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 436 U.S. 412 (1978) (truthful newspaper
advertising, including illustration of a Dalkon intrauterine device, by an attorney seeking
representation of IUD claimants, was a protected right)).
65
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mass tort cases, or small-claims consumer actions, inspired by the
considerable financial incentives to pursue these litigations.
The positive view is that attorneys are acting in 1960s-style as
private attorney-generals to police corporate wrong-doing and to
vindicate the rights of injured persons who otherwise might not seek or
obtain legal redress for their harms. The negative view is that the
modem mass tort case (and its cousin, the small claim-consumer class
action) is lawyer-generated and lawyer-driven litigation. Hence, in this
view, the common law concepts of barratry and champerty have
virtually been written out of modern aggregate litigation.
It is difficult, for example, to find a reported decision where a
proposed class action has been denied certification because of the
improper solicitation of class representatives. 70 Although the solicitation
of class representatives is not unknown, this fact will not vitiate
certification of a classY' Nor will it render either the class representative
72
or the class counsel "inadequate" for due process purposes.
Concededly, it might be argued that there is nothing wrong with
attorney solicitation of class clients because even if these claimants did
not seek out legal advice on their own, they are nonetheless truly
interested in the action-they simply did not have the energy or
wherewithal to seek legal assistance. Perhaps in absence of having
initiated contact with an attorney, these persons subsequently developed
an interest in the litigation once they learned of the action and the
prospect of legal relief.
But at the extreme, what then are we to make of an aggregate
litigation where virtually no one except the lawyers seems to have an
interest in the claims? This possibility is not as far-fetched as it sounds.
Recently, attorneys in south Texas sought certification of a class of
Remington rifle owners based on claims relating to an alleged defect in

70 See NEWBERG.& CONTE, supra note 69, at § 1504 (solicitation in class action litigation).
7' See id. (citing Fentron Indus. v. National Shopmen Pension Fund, 674 F.2d 1300, 1305 (9th
Cir. 1982) (no abuse of discretion in certifying dass even if employer possibly solicited
lawsuit; solicitation by parties is not prohibited and decertification of class might "impair
the associational rights of employers and employees")).
72 See NEWBERG & CONTE, supra note 69, at § 1504 (citing to Dupont Glore Forgan, Inc. v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 69 F.R.D. 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); In re Nissan Motor Corp. Litig., 22
Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 63 (S.D. Fla. 1975); cf. Kraus v. Patrson Parchment Paper Co.,
65 F.R.D. 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (solicited plaintiff found inadequate)).
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Model 700 fire controls and bolt locks7 3 At first blush this litigation
appears a somewhat odd congregation of unlikely litigantsstereotypical views suggest that gun owners are most likely to favor tort
reform, to oppose over-litigiousness, and to disapprove of class actions.
What, then, were these Texas riflemen doing in a class action seeking
damages for an alleged rifle defect?
As it turns out, the appellate court was not buying this attempted
class action, because the court reviewing class certification determined
that neither were the riflemen. The appellate court concluded that "a
careful reading of the entire record suggests a lack of interest beyond the
four named plaintiffs and even some indifference among them." 74 Even
more interesting, the court deflected the usual negative-value
justification for small claims consumer class actions (that is, that the
value of the defect to each class claimant is so small as to make it not
worthwhile for individuals to pursue separate claims).75
The point about solicitation is this: some mass tort and small claims
consumer class actions are now a long way removed from the concept of
party-initiated litigation. Instead, the last twenty years seem to have
inspired a free-ranging class of entrepreneurial lawyers who seek to
create the newest mass tort and/or small claims consumer class action
based on the abstract concept of a claim.
Indeed, in some extreme instances, the parties-plaintiff appears to be
almost superfluous or an afterthought- a necessary cipher for the
attorneys to develop the litigation and subsequently structure a
negotiated settlement of aggregated claims. The concept of the partyplaintiff has been diluted, and this in turn contributes to the idea that the
attorneys in these litigations essentially are free agents who identify the
problem, broker and draft the legislative compromise, and then seek
ratification of the court.

73Remington

Arms Co., Inc. v. Luna, 966 S.W.2d 641 (Tex. App. 1998) (review denied).
at 643.
Id. "According to the plaintiffs' brief in support of certification, this absence of litigation
demonstrated the claimants' inability to pursue individual claims. According to [the
defendant], the same absence of litigation demonstrated a lack of interest in resolving the
claim, if any. No evidence was introduced before the trial court about the interest of
potential class members in pursuing a class action or their ability to pursue individual
claims." Id.
74Id.
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B.

Adequate Representation

The concept of adequate representation is at the heart of the
problem of aggregate litigation and is a topic too broad and complex to
examine in any detail in this paper. However, some salient points
relating to the concept of adequate representation, the rhetoric
surrounding this topic, and the realities of modem aggregate litigation
are in order.
At the outset, the concept of adequate representation has different
significance depending on the procedural technique used to aggregate
claims. As indicated above, claims may be aggregated in consolidations,
multidistrict litigations, class actions, or other forms of joinder (including
simple joinder).
Aggregate claims also may be resolved through
alternative dispute resolution or through bankruptcy. What constitutes
representation (or adequate representation) in each of these contexts may
have different meanings. But it is important to understand that class
action litigation is the only form of aggregate litigation that requires, as a
matter of due process, the adequate representation of claimants.
Class action litigation has recently inspired a debate over the
concept of adequate representation. This debate has been propelled, in
part, by the Supreme Court's determination in 1997 that the class action
settlement in Amchem should not have been approved because of a lack
of adequacy of the class representatives. 76
The debate over adequacy arises because the class action, unlike
other procedural means for aggregating claims, is quintessentially
grounded in the theory of representationallitigation. That is, in contrast to
traditional litigation, individual claimants are not actually present to
oversee the conduct of the litigation, to supervise the lawyers, and to be
actively involved with the prosecution of their claims. The law
evocatively labels these faceless claimants the "absent class members" or
"unnamed class members," because they are truly absent and unnamed.
Instead, the class representatives and class counsel are the guardians
of the interests of these absent class members.
But, as many
commentators have observed, the interests of the class representatives,
absent class members, and their own class attorneys may not always be
congruent. Self-dealing class action lawyers may act in ways that are
adverse to the interests of the clients that they are supposed to be

76

See Amchem Prods., Inc., 117 S. Ct. at 2250-52.
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vigorously representing. Thus, courts must separately determine the
adequacy of the class representatives and class counsel,7 although some
courts have suggested that competent class counsel alone is sufficient to
satisfy the requirement of adequacy. 78
Until fairly recently, most courts did not pay much attention to
adequacy, simply paying lip-service to this requirement. In many class
certification decisions courts merely recite that adequacy is satisfied or
note that class counsel is competent to undertake the representation. But
in recent years some courts have manifested an increased interest in
conducting a more serious inquiry into the factual basis for the adequacy
finding and have elaborated lists of factors that courts should consider
when evaluating adequacy. 9
Yet, in spite of this newly inspired interest in factually ascertaining
the adequacy of class representatives, in reality many if not most class
representatives know little about the litigation, even less about the
concept of the class action, and almost nothing about the role and duties
of a class representative as a fiduciary. The phenomenon of the knownothing class representative is pervasive. Here, for example, is a
colloquy between an attorney and a class representative taken during a
deposition:
Q.
Have you spent any time trying to think
through or determine possible distinctions in the class
that you're seeking to represent?
A.
I don't understand the question.
Q.
Well, let me be more basic. Do you know or
understand what obligations in law you're undertaking
when you seek to be a representative of a class action?
A.
I'm not a lawyer.
Q.
Well, as a layperson and someone who is asking
the Court to represent a class of individuals, do you
know or have an understanding of your obligations?
A.
I guess I don't clearly understand that, no.

77 See, e.g., Southwestern Bell Yellow Pages, Inc. v. Waterin' Hole, Inc., 1997 WL 124110

(Tex. Ct. App. 1997) (unpublished opinion).
78 See, e.g., Health & Tennis Corp. v. Jackson, 928 S.W.2d 583, 589 (Tex. Ct App. 1996);
Microsoft Corp. v. Manning, 914 S.W.2d 602,614 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995) (cited by Southwestern
Bell Yellow Pages, 1997 WL 124110, at *3 n.2.).
79 See, e.g., Southwestern Bell Yellow Pages, 1997 WL 124110; Forsyth v. Lake LBJ Inv. Corp.,

903 S.W.2d 146 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995).
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Q.

Do you know who it is that you are seeking to
represent as a representative of this -- of a class?
A.
Not completely.
Q.
Do you have an understanding of who it is
you're asking the Court to represent?
A.
Repeat the question, please.
Q.
Do you have an understanding of who it is
you're asking the Court to represent?
A.
No, that's why I have attorneys.
Q.
To this point, how much time-before the start
of this deposition, how much actual time have you spent
learning the background of this case or your obligations
in this case or the facts of the case?
A.
Probably less time than we've been in this
deposition.
Q.
Okay, for the record, it 9:56, and we got a late
start, about 8:30 or 8:40; so, generally, about an hour?
A.
Maybe two.
Q.
All right. Tell me what you know about the
previous history of this case prior to your being
involved.
A.
Nothing.
Q.
Have you spoken with any of the other plaintiffs
in this case?
A.
No.
Q.
Do you know any of the other plaintiffs in this
case?
A.
No.
Q.
Do you know who the other plaintiffs are?
A.
No.
Q.
Have you spoken with any other advertiser who
has expressed an interest in wanting to be a plaintiff in
this case?
A.
No.80
The attorney in this deposition goes on to examine the class
representative concerning the class representative's knowledge of the
claims, the obligation for expenses, as well as recoverable damages:
topics on which the deponent had the same level of incomprehension. In

so Deposition of Mike D. Maddox, Waterin' Hole, Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Yellow Pages,
Inc., No. 95-03809 (250th Jud. Dist., Travis Cty. Texas 1998) (on file with author).
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the dozens and dozens of class representative depositions that I have
read, class representatives rarely if ever understand what a class action
litigation is, or what their duties are as fiduciaries for the absent class
members.
Furthermore, crucially for the due process concerns that are central
to the adequacy requirement, most class representatives have no concept
of the problem of intra-class conflicts among class members, the central
problem for the Amchem Court. Nor do most class representatives have
any concept that their role as guardian of the class requires that they
protect the absent class members from the possibility of self-dealing or
otherwise collusive behavior between class counsel and the opposing
attorneys. Thus, it is not at all uncommon for class representatives to
justify their complete lack of knowledge about the case, or their lack of
active involvement in the lawsuit, on the grounds that they have left the
litigation of the case to their attorneys.
Yet, in spite of this extreme type of testimonial evidence about the
guardians of the class, most courts simply look the other way, paying
nothing more than rhetorical homage to the necessity for the adequate
class representative. Thus, in modem mass tort and other forms of
aggregate litigation, including the small claims consumer class action,
there is dissonance between the rule requirement for adequacy and the
actual plaintiffs who assume this role. In much of this litigation the class
representative usually is little more than a figurehead, with class counsel
actually carrying the burden of adequate representation. That makes the
class attorneys the guardians of the absent class members, and the
answer to the question "who is guarding the guardians" becomes "not
the class representatives."
The class representative is supposed, in theory, to stand in the place
of the individual actual litigant who is actively supervising the attorney
and participating in the lawsuit. In most class litigation, however, the
class representatives do not do this, and thus the lawyers in the
litigation-counsel for the class and the opposing attomeys-are given
fairly free reign to control the conduct of the case and to broker a deal
affecting the interests of large numbers of people. Like the corpse of
Jeremy Bentham, class representatives are ceremonially wheeled out at
class certification hearings, not to be heard from again until a class
settlement is brokered, or perhaps never.
Thus, plaintiff and defense attorneys have become private brokers of
private disputes without meaningful client input or interaction. Indeed,
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the client may not even have instigated the lawsuit in the first place. The
lawyers then negotiate the deal, the consequences of which will affect
hundreds, thousands, or even hundreds of thousands of people. In
essence, once an aggregate litigation has been created and sanctioned by
a court, a dynamic is set in motion in which attorneys will work toward
creating private legislation with broad-reaching effects. In this model no
one elects the legislators and the representatives are not really
representatives.
C.

Objectors and Intervenors

If the class representatives do not in any practical sense operate as
guardians of the class, and if we have justifiable reasons to be worried
about the activities of class counsel, and if it is a given that the
defendants are not highly motivated to protect class claimants, then who
is actively representing and protecting the interest of unnamed class
claimants?
At the end of the twentieth century, an important hero rides into the
picture: the intervenor or the objector. Objectors come in at least two
styles: as a dissident class member s ' or as a stranger to the suit who must
formally intervene in order to have standing to present an objection. The
Supreme Court this Term, in a case styled California Public Employees'
Retirement System v. Felzen,82 is presented with an interesting variation on
the objector-standing issue in the context of shareholder derivative
litigation.
In theory, at least, the objector is yet another layer of protection for
the interests of class claimants. Appearing at the eleventh hour, the
objector is the white-hat cowboy whose self-designated role is to ferret
out self-dealing, collusive attorney behavior, and bad settlements.
Ironically, in this tableau, the white-hat objector turns the plaintiff's
counsel into the black-hat cowboy. As we have seen in recent years,
objectors have indeed played a crucial role in keeping all the players
honest. In both the Amchem and the Ahearn8 3 global asbestos settlements,
the same attorney, as an objector, litigated challenges to those

81 See Robert B. Gerard & Scott A. Johnson, The Role of the Objector in Class Action

Settlements-A Case Study of the General Motors Truck "Side Saddle" Fuel Tank Litigation, 31

LOY. L.A. L. REV. 409 (1998) ("In the context of class-action litigation, an 'objector' is a class
member who formally challenges a proposed class action settlement on the ground that the
settlement is not in the best interests of some or all of the class members.").
82 119 S. Ct. 1023 (1999).
3

8 Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 118 S. Ct. 2339 (1998).
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settlements all the way to the Supreme Court. As a consequence, it is
probably fair to say that class action attorneys who broker settlements
now operate in the shadow of potential (but yet unknown) objectors.
Notwithstanding this positive vision of the role of the objector, the
subtext to the objector-as-hero story is often somewhat more complex
and nuanced. As it turns out, pure-hearted and pure-motivated
objectors often have their own self-interests at stake in derailing
negotiated settlements, and these self-interests are apart from the
interests of class claimants. Thus, even Judge Weinstein, who believes
that mass tort cases are like public law litigation, has noted that "[m]ass
tort cases usually are driven by more obviously venal influences; that is
4
to say, payment of money is more clearly at issue."8
It is not uncommon for an objector to appear at the eleventh hour to
challenge a negotiated settlement for the ostensible purpose of protecting
class claimants but for the actual purpose of protecting the objector's
own inventory cases or for a cut of the action, meaning attorneys' fees.
This phenomenon has lead to the somewhat unseemly practice of the
objector buy-out, in which the plaintiffs and the defendants unite in their
interests to offer and guarantee the objector a piece of the action in return
for withdrawal (or modification) of the objections to the settlement. This
buy-out often works.85
The buy-out phenomenon inspires the next obvious question: who is
guarding the interests of class claimants from the potential self-dealing
of self-appointed objectors who appear upon the settlement scene
claiming to be defending the interests of the class? In theory, at least, the

84Weinstein, supra note 30, at 476. To give Judge Weinstein his due, the entire quotation

reads as follows:
While the resolution of public institutional litigation depends upon the
availability of cash, the improvement of living conditions underlies the
litigation. Mass tort cases usually are driven by more obviously venal
influences; that is to say, payment of money is more dearly at issue.
Nevertheless, mass tort litigations often have an underlying... purpose
which goes beyond mere transfers of wealth-the health and sense of
security of many individuals and the viability of major economic
institutions.

Id.
One of the most compelling tales of an objector reversing positions in the context of the
same litigation concerns the role Public Citizen, a consumer activist group founded by
Ralph Nader, played in the General Motors Corp. Fuel Tank Products Liability Litigation.
This reversal was motivated, in part, by attorney's fees. See Gerard & Johnson, supra note
81, at 427-33.
8
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last bastion of class protection is the court, which ultimately must
scrutinize and approve any class settlement. But more often than not, if
there has been an objector buy-out negotiated and agreed to by all the
players, the court will also approve the buy-out in the interests of
bringing closure to a complex litigation.86 At least two attorneys writing
about the sell-out potential inherent in the self-interests of objectors have
suggested instituting various reforms that include "monitoring of
objectors to proposed settlements to assure that any proposed payment
to them by class counsel and the settling defendant is fair, based on some
tangible added value to class members." 87
D. Copy-Cat Litigation, Forum-Shopping,Attorney Fees, and OtherProblems
The portrait of the contemporary aggregate litigation would not be
complete without discussion of an array of other characteristics,
including block settlements, aggregate damages, attorneys' fees, and use
of judicial surrogates. But the subject is too vast to be encompassed here.
Mass tort and small claims consumer class actions seem to have rebottled
an array of old problems in new and unique ways.
Moreover, these cases tend to be sprawling in a different sense than
Professor Chayes contemplated. Thus, mass tort and small claims
consumer actions geographically sprawl all over the country, spreading
across state lines and between federal and state court systems. These
cases also are characterized by temporal sprawl; in the mass tort arena, a
class of claimants may aggregate currently-injured clients as well as
exposure-only future claimants, allowing these cases to extend
backwards and forwards in time.
The sprawl problem has another dimension that also is characteristic
of end-of-the-century aggregate litigation; these cases tend to inspire
almost instantaneous copy-cat litigation. No sooner has one attorney
filed a mass tort action in one jurisdiction (or a small claims consumer
class action) than within days or weeks copy-cat versions will be filed in
multiple jurisdictions throughout the country. The consequences of
copy-cat litigation are profound, not the least of which are the immense
transaction costs to the parties and the judicial system simultaneously
supporting such duplicative litigation.

Bowling v. Pfizer, 922 F. Supp. 1261 (S.D. Ohio 1996), affd, 102 F.3d 777 (6th Cir. 1996)
(approval of attorney fee petition, including provision for payment of fees to, and future
employment
of, "special counsel").
87
Gerard &Johnson, supra note 81, at 434.
86See
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Copy-cat litigation is simply a modem variation on an old theme;
that is, the race to the courthouse and the race to judgment. In complex
mass tort litigation, though, the stakes involved are exponentially
increased. Contemporary aggregate litigation has inspired interesting.
and innovative variations on the copy-cat theme; for example, the
attempt to certify a state class action consisting of the opt-outs of
claimants from a federal class. Is it possible to certify a state class
consisting of federal opt-outs, which would be the very people who did
88
not want to be involved in the federal class action?
In the federal system, at least, the problem of copy-cat litigation is
alleviated somewhat by the existence of the multidistrict litigation
statute, because it allows the federal courts to transfer and consolidate all
actions sharing common facts into one venue. In recent years the MDL
procedural mechanism has been used more aggressively to create mass
tort and small claims consumer MDLs.
But the MDL procedure does not cure problems by aggregating
separate cases into one forum. The next step in this dance is the
incredible squabbling for designation as MDL counsel or a place on the
MDL litigation committees. This, essentially, is an exercise grounded in
the prospect of attorneys' fees and also constitutes the fertile garden for
cultivating the seedlings of future objectors. The MDL, in turn, creates a
giant bureaucratic structure-the mass tort meets Max Weber-that
eventually, in most instances, morphs into a class settlement of claims.
But the drama does not necessarily end there. The possibilities for
subverting, derailing, or abandoning a negotiated settlement are
endlessly various.
The creation of federal MDLs also does not deal with state copy-cat
litigation, and there is no authority or mechanism to effectively deal with
multiple simultaneous state copy-cat lawsuits scattered throughout the
country. The sprawling nature of contemporary mass tort and small
claims consumer class actions has inspired an array of inconsistent
decisions relating to the propriety of certifying proposed classes based
88 See, e.g., Richardson v. The Prudential Ins. Co., Cause No. 95-113114 (53rd Jud. Dist.
Travis City, Texas 1997). In Richardson, the Texas state court declined to certify a state class
consisting of opt-outs from the federal class that had settled claims against the Prudential
Insurance Co. in a New Jersey federal district court. However, other state courts have
permitted certification of classes of opt-outs. See, e.g., In re Prudential Ins. Co. of America
Sales Practices Litig., 962 F. Supp. 450 (D.N.J. 1997) (approving class settlement), affd, 148
F.3d 283 (3d Cir. 1998); Polaris Pub. Income Funds v. Einhom, 625 So. 2d 128 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1993); In re MCA, Inc., Shareholders Litig., 598 A.2d 687 (Del. Ch. 1991).
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on the same facts or legal theories. Unhappy lawyers or claimants can
simply abandon the federal system and broker a more favorable deal
someplace else.
Thus, one of the most striking complications of the mass tort and
consumer class action sprawl is the phenomenon of forum-shopping
settlements between systems. Perhaps the most evocative description of
this problem has been drawn by Robert B. Gerard and Scott A. Johnson,
two mass tort practitioners. They use the following hypothetical as an
explanation:
ABC, a large automobile manufacturer, becomes the
target of numerous class actions which allege that some
of its vehicles have a design defect that makes them
prone to burst into flames in a collision. ABC denies any
such defect, but because it has sold millions of the
vehicles, it faces potentially ruinous liability if it must
recall or repair the vehicles.
To avoid this result, ABC approaches the plaintiffs'
lawyers in one of the class actions and proposes a
nationwide settlement. In exchange for dismissal of all
claims related to the alleged safety defect, ABC will give
each class member a coupon, good for $1000 off the price
of a new ABC vehicle. Additionally, ABC will agree to
award plaintiffs' attorneys a little more than $9 million
in fees. The plaintiffs attorneys agree to this settlement.
Troubled because ABC has made no attempt to remedy
the safety defect and has made no cash payment to class
members, and troubled by the apparent conflict of
interest created by ABC's willingness to pay such
staggering fees to class counsel, some of the class
members object to the settlement. They eventually
convince a court of appeals to throw out the settlement
and remand the case for further proceedings. ABC and
class counsel decide to take the settlement to a new
forum.
Specifically, they go to a small court in another state
where one of the other class actions against ABC has
been filed, and where they believe the judge favors class
action settlements. ABC then agrees to increase the
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attorneys' fee award so that the counsel in the new state
can be included, and so that counsel for the objectors can
share in the award. Faced with smiling attorneys, all of
whom praise the settlement, and with many objectors
now acting as proponents, the state court issues a
judgment approving the settlement. ABC can then take
that judgment to all the other states where the class
actions were filed and argue that it must be given full
faith and credit, thereby disposing of all claims against it
throughout the country.
This arrangement works for almost everyone. ABC has
extinguished potentially massive liability, and in so
doing has helped encourage future sales of its vehicles to
class members who will feel obligated to use the
coupons. Class counsel have reaped an award of
millions of dollars, without significant work or risk, and
counsel for the previous objectors share in that award.
The courts have unwieldy and time-consuming
litigation removed from their already congested
calendars.
This leaves only the class members without any
substantial benefit, but no one remains to speak for the
class's interests-no one except the objector. 89
IV. THE NEW MASS TORT PARADIGM
Obviously, we are now quite some distance from Professor Chayes's
description of the public interest law paradigm. Mid-way through his
analysis, Professor Chayes pauses to offer a "morphology of the public
law litigation," a model consisting of eight characteristics. 90 The
challenge for the contemporary commentator, then, is to formulate a
"morphology" of the complex litigation that is now prevalent
throughout the federal and state court systems.

89

See Gerard & Johnson, surpa note 81, at 410. The description of these "machinations" is
based on In re Pickup Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 1996 WL 683785 (E.D. Pa. Nov.
25, 1996) and In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55
F.3d 768 (3d Cir. 1995).
90 See Chayes, supra note 1, at 1302.
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Both the American Law Institute and the RAND Corporation, 91 in
the late 1980s and early 1990s, made attempts to describe the
morphology of mass tort litigation. Both descriptions are quite similar,
but the ALI's description is more succinct:
From the process perspective, the salient features
defining characteristics of a mass tort include:
(1)
numerous victims who have
filed or might file damage claims
against the same defendant(s);
(2)
claims arising from a single
event or transaction, or from a series of
similar events or transactions spread
over time;
(3)
questions of law and fact that
are complex and expensive to litigate
and adjudicate-frequently questions
that are scientific and technological in
nature;
(4)
important issues of law and fact
which are identical or common to all or
substantial subgroups of the claims;
(5)
injuries
that
are
widely
dispersed over time, territory, and
jurisdiction;
(6)
causal
in
indeterminacyespecially in cases involving toxic
substance exposure-that precludes use
of conventional procedures to determine
and standards to measure any causal
connection between the plaintiff's injury
and the defendant's tortious conduct;
and
(7)
disease and other injuries from
long delayed latent risks, especially in

'I MARK A. PETERSON AND MOLLY SELVIN, INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, RESOLUTION OF

MASS TORTS: TOWARD A FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATION OF AGGREGATIVE PROCEDURES vii,

31-37 (1988).
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substance

This is a fine start, but this description does not capture the texture,
nuance, and grit of the ways in which these cases actually are processed.
The description fails to capture the bureaucratization and privitization of
aggregate claims resolution.
The description fails to capture the
problems with adequate representation and forum-shopping.
The
description fails to capture the core essence that, to use Judge
Weinstein's words, "these cases are driven by more obviously venal
influences," rather than the operation of public policy.
Contemporary mass tort litigation needs another Professor Chayes
to weave together all these strands. After setting forth his morphology
of the public interest law litigation, Professor Chayes concluded: "In
fact, one might say that, from the perspective of the traditional model,
the proceeding is recognizable as a lawsuit only because it takes place in
a courtroom before an official called a judge." That insight applies with
equal force to contemporary aggregate tort litigation. But we need a
theoretician with greater analytical power and a more descriptive
vocabulary than me to accurately capture the new mass tort paradigm.

American Law Institute, Enterprise Responsibility for Personal Injury (Reporters' Study
1991), reprintedin, LINDA S. MULLENIX, MASS TORT LIGAT1ON 26 (1996).
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